Operation Bluestar

Article Published in rediff.com on June 03, 2004, these are the views of General Kuldip Singh Brar who carried out the operation..

Twenty years ago almost to the day an event occurred in Punjab that shook the Republic of India to its very foundations.

Sikh extremists seeking to carve an independent country had been slowly but surely taking control of the state over the previous couple of years, striking terror in the hearts of politicians, law-enforcers, and the general population.

The killings began in 1983 with a murder here, a shootout there. Through the year, however, the frequency of attacks and the toll kept rising and by May 1984 dozens of innocent people were being murdered daily in cold blood, all in the name of 'freedom.'

A massive religious cleansing movement was underway in Punjab, which had become India's granary after the Green Revolution of the mid-to-late 1960s. Law and order had collapsed, and the corrupt and demoralised Punjab police was simply not up to the task of restoring it.

Heading this bloody movement was Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, a preacher turned separatist who ran his terrorist campaign from the confines of the Golden Temple, the holiest shrine of the Sikhs, in Amritsar. Bhindranwale openly defied the Indian State from his sanctuary. But the police dared not enter the temple complex, for fear of outraging the sentiments of the Sikhs, arguably India's most dynamic and popular minority community.

With the situation rapidly getting out of hand, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi took a momentous decision. She ordered the Indian Army to move into Punjab and decisively tackle the terrorists who were armed and aided by Pakistan.

To flush the terrorists and their masterminds out of the Golden Temple complex, the army launched what is possibly its most controversial action, Operation Bluestar, under the command of Major General Kuldip Singh Brar (who later retired as lieutenant general).

But the operation, which began in the wee hours of June 6, 1984, was like a dagger through the heart for Sikhs everywhere. Thousands railed against the Indian State, the army, and all those who were connected in any way with the operation. A large number of Sikh soldiers, enraged by rumours that the Golden Temple had been damaged (the temple itself remained untouched, though the Akal Takht was damaged), deserted the armed forces. Author Khushwant Singh famously returned his Padma Bhushan award in protest. Captain Amarinder Singh, now the chief minister of Punjab, resigned from the Congress party. Four months and three weeks later, Indira Gandhi paid the ultimate price for ordering Operation Bluestar.

Twenty years on, rediff.com takes a fresh look at the events of June 1984 and the circumstances leading up to them.

The Rediff Interview/Lieutenant General Kuldip Singh Brar (retired)

When military officers retire, they move into what the armed forces euphemistically call 'civilian areas,' where the likes of you and me live. But when Lieutenant General Kuldip Singh Brar retired, he had to reside in the cantonment area of Mumbai, in a bungalow guarded by a huge black gate, with army soldiers and policemen on watch round the clock.

Brar is probably the most protected army officer today, in service or retired. And all because one fateful night, 20 years ago, the then major general commanded Indian Army soldiers who entered the Golden Temple.

Operation Bluestar, as the mission was called, to flush out militants from the holiest Sikh shrine [on par with the Vatican for Catholics and the Kaaba for Muslims; the Hindu faith has no single equivalent to the Golden Temple] remains till date one of the military's most difficult missions.

The army had been ordered to destroy the movement to create Khalistan and to cleanse the Golden Temple of all the militants hiding there, including the leader of the militants, Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.

June 6 marks the 20th anniversary of Operation Bluestar, the codename for the operation to enter and capture, dead or alive, the militants and terrorists who had turned the Golden Temple into their fortress.

At his home in Mumbai, the retired general agreed to journey back to that difficult time in an interview with Deputy Managing Editor Amberish K Diwanji. The first of a four part interview to understand the logic behind the Indian Army's most controversial operation.

Twenty years later, how do you look back on Operation Bluestar?

I look back in sorrow that it had to happen.

Apparently, the government had no other recourse. The events in Punjab had reached a complete breakdown.

The Sikh militants were in total control of the state machinery. There was a strong feeling that Khalistan was going to be established at any time. [Jarnail Singh] Bhindranwale was being seen as a prophet; he was making very strong speeches against [the then prime minister] Indira Gandhi and non-Sikhs; and trying to send a message across to the rural areas that the Sikhs are being given second-grade treatment and that it is high time we formed our own independent state of Khalistan. There was a strong possibility of Pakistan helping them and I think there was the possibility of a Bangladesh being repeated.

I can't comment on the inside of politics, but I assume that after taking everything into consideration, the prime minister and the government decided this was the only course of action left if we were to keep this country together, to prevent its fragmentation, to prevent Khalistan. And having seen reports of about 2,000 militants inside [Amritsar's Golden Temple] with any number of machine guns, different types of weapons, it was clearly beyond the capabilities of the police force to flush out the militants from the Golden Temple; the task had to be entrusted to the Army.

As a soldier, if I am given an order, I obey it and 20 years later, all I can say is I wish the situation had never risen that such an order had to be passed. And God forbid we have to do it again.

How did you motivate the soldiers?

No soldier enjoys or cherishes taking up arms against his fellow citizens. But they also know that there are many situations, be it in Nagaland, Mizoram, Assam, Tamil Nadu, Punjab or Kashmir, where the Army has to be called in. When the Army is called in, we don't think about of religion, caste, creed, ethnicity; we are sworn to the Constitution of India, our primary role is to safeguard the national security of the country and we have to act on orders to do so.

Why did the army go in just after Guru Arjan's martyrdom day, when the number of devotees is much higher?

That was a coincidence. You must try and understand that perhaps the government had just about three or four days to carry out the operation. We had some sort of information that Khalistan was going to be declared any moment. You try and figure out that one fine day, Bhindranwale declares Khalistan and hoists the Khalistan flag...

The Khalistani currency had already been distributed; Pakistan was pumping in money, they wanted a strong part of India, which is Punjab, to secede and for India to disintegrate.

Can you imagine if one fine day Khalistan has been declared, what would have happened? Pakistan would have recognised Khalistan and crossed the borders to support Khalistan, like we did in Bangladesh. The Punjab police might have crossed over to support Bhindranwale...

Did you fear that happening?

Of course! After all, emotions then were very high. I am not saying that the entire Punjab police would have crossed over, but a large section might have. If there could be desertions in the army, then the police, who were in Punjab, who were privy to Bhindranwale's speeches, might have [also deserted]; they were also emotionally charged by what was happening.

Moreover, Hindus and non-Sikhs were leaving Punjab while Sikhs in Delhi and Haryana were moving to Punjab, causing further fear and apprehension. The law and order situation in such a case would have been beyond the police force and difficult for the Army.

Would we have been on the border to stop Pakistan? Would we have been working on maintaining law and order with huge migrations underway? Would we be disarming the police and militia for fear that they might go over to the other side?

It would have been a task well beyond the army. So whether we could have waited a few days is something the politicians can best answer. But the impression given to us was that we had very little time.

Next: 'There is always a limit to how much any country can take

In the second part of a four-part interview with Deputy Managing Editor Amberish K Diwanji, General Brar looks back at the compulsions that forced him to send his men into the Temple:

Part I: 'Pakistan would have recognised Khalistan and crossed the borders'

Were you given a timeframe within which to act?

The fastest possible. When I met my CO [commanding officer] Lieutenant General K Sundarji [then General Officer Commanding, Western Command; he later became Chief of Army Staff] at Chandimandir [in Chandigarh], he told me he would fly down in 48 hours to hear my first briefing. Time was at a premium.

So we moved all night and got our forces into Amritsar and then the Temple.

What about a siege to flush out the militants?

A siege is easily spoken of. A siege is only effective when you are able to make the people under siege unable to continue to stay under siege. That means they have no water, no food, no electricity, no ammunition and are forced to surrender or to capitulate.

But, in the Golden Temple, there is no shortage of water. There are any number of wells; besides there is the Sarovar [the Holy Lake on the premises of the Temple]. There are a number of generators. There is no shortage of food -- every day, thousands of devotees flock to the Temple bringing with them food and provisions, so there is enough food to feed a few hundreds of thousands of people for over a month [food is served free of cost to the devotees every day in the Golden Temple; this food is made from offerings by the devotees], and here we are talking of forcing the hand of a few thousands…

The other problem of a siege was that, once laid, word would have spread to the hinterland within 24 hours. Every villager in Punjab would be told the Golden Temple was under siege. In those days, every rumour or fact was exaggerated; such messages are sent out emotionally, thus surcharging the atmosphere. People would have picked up their swords or lances and hundreds of thousands would have converged on Amritsar and the Golden Temple and besieged the army that was besieging the Temple! We can't fire at these people, and we can't surrender, so what are we to do? We didn't want such a situation to arise.

After asking the militants to surrender [on June 5], we waited and waited. It soon became 8 o'clock, then 9 o'clock and was nearing 10 o'clock. We were worried. We had to finish the operation before dawn [around 5.30 am] for fear of mobs amassing around the Temple. The news would spread fast that we hadn't cleared out the militants, then we would be under siege. People must understand these things.

It is very easy to say to we could have laid siege, we could have postponed it for a day or two, or carried out the operation without the loss of life. It is only we, who were there at that time, who know what our limitations and needs were. Our soldiers went into what you would call a death trap. They had no cover, they were out in the open [when moving from the entrances to the various rooms and sections where the militants were hiding]; in contrast, the militants had barricaded every window and were heavily armed…

So ultimately you had to finish off the operation in 48 hours, because you feared Pakistan coming in?

That was the biggest fear. It had to be a surgical operation and one that caused the minimum damage with least loss of blood but it had to be as quick as possible because once word got around, there would have been a flood of people… like the Brahmaputra. When the Brahmaputra floods, there is nothing you can do. No amount of sandbags can stop the flood.

What about the innocent pilgrims inside?

We were to go in at 7 pm [on June 5]. Since afternoon, we used the public address system to keep asking those who were inside to surrender. We told them we don't want to come in, we pointed out that there were pilgrims inside, there were women and children inside, and we told the militants that if they want to fight it out, do so but for God's sake to at least send the pilgrims, the old, the young, out safely. But until 7 pm, nothing happened.

I asked the police if they could send emissaries inside to help get the innocent people out, but the police said that anyone sent inside would not come out again. They said the militants were no doubt keeping the pilgrims as a sort of trump card, believing their presence would stop the army from coming in. Eventually, about 100 sick and old people were let out, but not the rest. They told us the others were not being allowed to come out.

I feel sorry for the innocent people who died in the crossfire.

In the fight, you were dealing with a former superior, Major General [retired] Shahbeg Singh [a highly decorated army officer who, after being dismissed from service for financial irregularities, became a close accomplice of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale].

Yes, and he knew something was up because the day before, I had walked around the Golden Temple in civilian clothes and seen the militants and the barricades. And he saw me taking my rounds so he knew something was up. We had gone into Bangladesh together.

Was he a formidable enemy?

He was a very seasoned soldier who won the Mahavir Chakra [India's second highest bravery award in war] in 1971, who had to leave the army for whatever reason. He was a highly emotional person and had joined with Bhindranwale. Perhaps he believed that with the pilgrims inside, the Indian Army would not come in but he never realised there is always a limit to how much any country can take.

How difficult was the operation?

It was in the middle of the night. One cannot see and one is out in the open and under fire from the militants holed up behind barricades. Plus I was constantly screaming at the men inside that come what may, they were not to fire in the direction of the Harmindar Sahib [the sanctum sanctorum where the Sikh holy book, the Guru Granth Sahib, is kept during the day] and that even if there was fire from that side they were not to return fire. Later, there were a couple of bullet holes in the Harmindar Sahib, which could have been the militants' fire or odd stray fire from the soldiers. Otherwise there was no damage to the Harmindar Sahib.

Even at the Akal Takht [seen above], there would have been no damage. Our soldiers tried to lob stun grenades [which release gas that momentarily stuns people without causing any collateral damage]. But the Akal Takht was completely sealed and there was no way to lob the stun grenades inside. And when our soldiers were crawling towards the Akal Takht for some commandos to get in, they were being mowed down by enemy fire. They were being killed by the dozen, it was a terrible sight.

As you know Bhindranwale had shifted to the first floor of the Akal Takht. How did the Sikhs allow that? It was against the religion's tenets. The Akal Takht is where the Guru Granth Sahib [the Sikh holy book] is kept at night after being taken from the Harmindar Sahib. No one is allowed to stay above the Guru Granth Sahib, but Bhindranwale and his immediate accomplices were living on the Akal Takht's first floor.

The members of the SGPC [the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee which has managerial control of the Golden Temple and other gurdwaras in India] were living elsewhere in the Temple. They had long lost control of the situation and had no say in what was happening. The writ of Bhindrawale ran not just in the Golden Temple or in Amritsar but throughout Punjab.

Why were the tanks brought in?

Tanks were brought in late to illuminate the Akal Takht, so that the soldiers could see where they were going and to momentarily blind the militants in the glare of the lights. Those who have seen these huge halogen lights know these lights fuse in 20, 30 seconds, so the tanks had to keep going in and coming out. It was not an easy task at all.

Next: 'You are not acting against any religion but against a section of misguided people'

In the third part of a four-part interview with Deputy Managing Editor Amberish K Diwanji, General Brar talks about his feelings as a Sikh who sent soldiers into his religion's most revered site.

Why were you were chosen for the task?

I have no idea. I was then commanding 9 Division [as a major general] based in Meerut. Two of my brigades comprised of Sikhs. My brigades were in Meerut, Delhi, Jalandhar, and I was asked overnight to move to Amritsar. A division was sitting in Amritsar, but it was moved to the border in case Pakistan decided to move in. I had no clue as to of the layout of the Golden Temple; I had to set up an operations room and I was given charge of the paramilitary and the Punjab police.

I could not tell them why I was there for fear word might leak out, so I didn't tell the others until just before the operation. The wheat agitation [farmers had threatened not to send wheat out of Punjab] was happening in Punjab then and killings were rising.

When you were summoned from Meerut, did you know what was in store?

Not at all. It came as a big surprise. I was called for a meeting to Chandimandir [Chandigarh] on May 31. In fact, my wife and I were all set to fly to Manila... the Philippines... on the night of June 1; I was off on a month-long vacation. We had our tickets and our travellers' cheques ready and, on May 31, I get this call asking me to come to Chandimandir. So we drive at night from Meerut to Delhi and I tell my wife to buy the gifts from Cottage Industries and tell her I'd take the helicopter to Chandimandir and get back by evening so that we could take the night flight to Manila. At Chandimandir, there were cars waiting for me and maps laid out on the table and I was told I'd have to take a flight to Amritsar.

I said I was going on vacation to Manila. [Lt General Ranjit Singh] Dayal [chief staff officer to Sundarji and in charge of Amritsar during Operation Bluestar] and Sundarji conferred with each other and later told me I'd have to cancel my leave. So I said give me two minutes to call my wife and tell her that I am not returning to Delhi and to cancel our tickets. In fact, our hosts did not even know we were not on the flight and were waiting for us at the airport; it was only later when they saw the news on television that they realised why I had not made it to Manila.

As a soldier, you don't question why. You do your task. I would say Sundarji and Dayal had faith in me. I had been involved in anti-insurgency operations in Nagaland and Mizoram and was thus tested.

But how did you feel as a Sikh? Are you very religious?

I am religious but in moderation. I am not a person who has to be in a temple every single day, but I have a fear of God. I respect religion, and respect the fact that I am a Sikh.

But as I said earlier, a Sikh or a Hindu has no meaning here [in the armed forces]. You don't even think about it. You are convinced you are not acting against any religion but against a section of misguided people who have held the country to ransom, who are ready to fragment this country...

But the operation did hurt the sentiments of hundreds of thousands of Sikhs, including many who had never supported the militants.

Certainly, I don't deny that. But this had to happen and yes, many were hurt by what happened.

My own mama [mother's brother] who lives in London -- he didn't keep long hair, he used to smoke, visit pubs and I used to stay with him whenever I was visiting the UK -- suddenly changed. He began to grow his hair and beard; he used to regularly participate in the functions at Southall [in London] where the Sikhs vowed revenge; he went to Pakistan; he swore he'd have never have anything to do with me. He broke ties with my parents… his own sister.

Then just three years ago, I was in London and found out he was dying of cancer. I decided I must see him and went to the hospital. The staff told me he had about 24 to 48 hours to live. When they informed him of my presence, he told them to bring me to his bedside and he held my hand; he had tears rolling down his cheeks and he told me he now understood I had to do whatever I did.

I got a letter from a Sikh gentleman in Canada who said that after reading about Operation Bluestar, if he had had the chance, he would have killed me. But he said that after reading my book [Operation Bluestar: The True Story], he realised the people who had let the Sikhs down were some Sikhs and the internal politics of the Akalis, and he understood that, as a soldier, I did what I had to do. He said I cleaned the temple.

He even offered to pay for translating the book into Punjabi so that more people could read it. In the event, my publishers did the translation and this book has gone into 10 or 11 reprints and is now easily available outside gurdwaras all over Punjab.

How about your parents? There is this well-known story of how the mother of General Dayal [also a Sikh] refused to eat until her son personally assured her that the Harmindar Sahib was safe. Were your parents similarly perturbed?

Not so much. They were, of course, upset that I, as a Sikh, had commanded the operation. But my father too is a soldier [D S Brar served in World War II and retired as major general] and he understood the compulsions of a soldier. In fact, they didn't even know I was commanding the operation until the whole thing became public.

In this concluding instalment of a four-part exclusive interview with Deputy Managing Editor Amberish K Diwanji, General Brar talks of how he motivated his soldiers to participate what was undoubtedly the single most traumatic operation by the Indian Army ever.

Soldiers are God fearing. How did you motivate your men to carry out the operation in a holy shrine?

On the day we went in, I decided I must talk to the men personally and tell them what we were doing and why we were doing it. I began at 4 am in the morning [of June 5], spent half an hour with the first unit; then half an hour with the next unit and so on. To every one of them, I explained this was not a mission against any religion or a temple, but a mission against some militants who have defiled the temple; it was no longer a place of sanctity but a defiled place and we were going to clean it out.

Even so, I told my men if any one of them wanted to opt out of this operation, they were welcome. I gave them my word that they would not be hounded nor would their unit commanding officer mark them negatively.

No one put his hand up to back out, not in the first, not in the second, not in the third…

In the fourth battalion, one hand went up. It belonged to a Sikh officer, Second Lieutenant Jasbir Singh Raina, in the unit commanded by [Lieutenant Colonel] Mohammad Israr [Lt Col Israr of the 10 Guards would lead the first unit into the Golden Temple]. I told Raina if he wanted to stay out, he need have no fear in doing so. Raina replied he had a request: he wanted to be the first person to enter the Golden Temple to wipe the militants who had defiled his holiest shrine. I was very happy and told Israr that Raina must be allowed to lead the first charge.

The moment Raina entered, he came under a withering fire and suffered serious injuries to his legs. Yet, he refused to pull out. Israr Israr rang me up saying Raina was refusing to evacuate. I then ordered Israr to get Raina out and into the waiting ambulance. Months later, when he received the Ashoka Chakra [the highest bravery award in peace times], he came to receive the award in a wheelchair. I had tears in my eyes because I remembered this young boy standing up to say he wanted be the first to enter. These are things that not many people know.

As a commander, you have to explain it to your men. I told them I was going in, but if they didn't want to do so, I understood and promised them no harm. Yet, not one person walked away. Not one.

You are still paying a price for your role in Operation Bluestar with all this security at your home.

One knows that. You have to pay a price and one has to be careful. But I look at it this way: if your time is up, it is up. You can die in your sleep, in your car, walking on the road. Nothing can stop that from happening. There have been attempts on my life but so far none have succeeded. I am fortunate to be here, but tomorrow I may not be here.

Of all the internal operations by the Indian Army, this would have been the most difficult one.

It was also the most traumatic, the most painful. I remember briefing the Foreign Correspondents Club [in New Delhi] after the operation and one person asked me how we could do it. I found out he was British, so I asked him if militants take over St Paul's Cathedral, killings start in the cathedral and despite your best efforts, you can't stop that, how would the British army react? He agreed the British army too would enter the cathedral.

Then there was the case in Saudi Arabia, when the Kaaba was taken over by terrorists. Traditionally, no non-Muslim is supposed to go near the Kaaba but, to end the terrorist takeover, the Saudis called in French commandos and killed every terrorist.

As a soldier, this is what I have to do.

Many military officers who are now seeking to avoid using the Indian Army in civil operations. Do you agree?

Very much! The last thing the army wants is to be deployed within India for law and order operations. But places like Nagaland, Mizoram, Kashmir, Punjab… they come under a different category. Here, there are armed insurgents and militants, with sophisticated weapons, financed from abroad, heavily motivated, ready to give up their lives… The police forces with their 303 rifles [of World War II vintage] and their outdated method cannot tackle such militants beyond a level. That is when there is no choice. The army has to step in.

Now the army has been able to prevail upon the government to set up a paramilitary force -- the Rashtriya Rifles -- commanded by army officers but including policemen. Every army chief has told the government that it is not in the interest of the army for it to enter civil situations, because it is at the cost of our morale and our operational ability. I can tell you that the government is strengthening such forces, but till such time as they become self sufficient, the army will always remain as a back up force. How else would you deal with the situation in a place like Kashmir?